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THE LANDOWNER'S DUTY TO LICENSEES IN MISSOURI: CHANGE IN AN
OUTMODED LAW?
Wells v. Goforth, 443 S. W.2d 155 (Mo. 1969)
Plaintiff was not warned of the icy condition of defendant's porch. As
she was leaving his home, she slipped and fell. She brought an action for
damages, arguing that her hosts knowingly let her "go into a Hidden
Peril, Trap, or Ultra-Hazardous Condition", or in the alternative "were
guilty of Active Negligence."' Defendants denied both allegations. The
trial court, relying on the actual knowledge test of the Restatement of
Torts First § 342,2 found for plaintiff on the question of fact. Defendant
appealed, contending that the court erred in patterning its instructions
after the first Restatement "which has been explicitly rejected in
Missouri". 3 The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the lower court's
finding that an icy porch is an ultra-hazardous condition and that failure
to warn constituted active negligence. However, it remanded on the
grounds that plaintiff might be allowed recovery under the first
Restatement § 342 if she could prove actual knowledge.4
In feudal times, the English landowner's sovereignty was virtually
unlimited by obligations to visitors on his property.' The common law
"no liability" concept was eventually limited by the classification of
those coming onto the land as trespassers, licensees, and invitees, with a
varying degree of care owed to each.' This was due to an increased
1. Brief for Respondent at 5, Wells v. Goforth, 443 S.W.2d 155 (Mo. 1969).
2. A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to gratuitous licensees
by a natural or artificial condition thereof if, but only if, he
(a) knows of the condition and realizes that it involves an unreasonable risk to them and has
reason to believe that they will not discover the condition or realize the risk, and
(b) invites or permits them to enter or remain upon the land, without exercising reasonable
care
(i) to make the condition reasonably safe, or
(ii) to warn them of the condition and the risk involved therein.
2 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 342 (1934).
3. Brief for Appellant at 19, Wells v. Goforth, 443 S.W.2d 155, 158 (Mo. I1969).
4. Wells v. Goforth, 443 S.W.2d 155 (Mo. 1969).
5. The king's law stopped at the boundary of the owner's sovereign territory .... When
the comparatively modern law of negligence reached the relations of landowners to persons
entering his property, it found the field occupied by the concept of the owner's right as
sovereign to do what he pleased on or with his own property.
F. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS 163, 164 (1926) [hereinafter cited as BOHLEN]. See
generally McCleary, The Liability of a Possessor of Land in Missouri to Persons Injured While on
the Land, I Mo. L. REV. 45 (1936); Marsh, The History and Comparative Law of Invitees,
Licensees, and Trespassers, 69 L. Q. REv. 182, 184-85 (1953).
6. Marsh, The History and Comparative Law of Invitees, Licensees, and Trespassers, 69 L. Q.
REV. 182, 198 (1953); see also Southecote v. Stanley, 156 Eng. Rep. 1195 (Ex. 1856); Indemaur v.
Dames, L.R.IC.P. 274 (1866); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 27.1 (1956)
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judicial concern for the "general principles of negligence" at the expense
of traditional concepts of property law.7
At common law, it was generally agreed that a possessor's duty to
trespassers (those entering without consent) was limited to refraining
from intentional inflictions of harm.' However, a minority would hold
the possessor liable for recklessness as well.9
Early common law courts held that licensees (those who enter with
permission, but without an intent to confer economic benefit on the
possessor), like trespassers, were owed nothing beyond protection from
the intentional trap. 0 Gradually there arose a distinction between the
two classes. A possessor was held liable for failing to disclose ". . . any
defect of which he actually knows and which he should recognize as
creating a risk of injury [to the licensee] . . . ."" But he owed no duty
of inspecting the premises prior to the licensee's arrival.12
To the invitee (or so-called "business guest" 3), the possessor was
held to a duty of inspecting the premises, and to warn of or repair any
defect which he discovers or should have discovered.' At common law,
the duty owed to licensees was based on a subjective or "actual know-
ledge" requirement. By contrast, that owed to invitees was objective,
based on the "reasonable man" test.
A survey of decisions in the United States indicates that, prior to
about 1900, almost all jurisdictions adhered to the feudal "no duty"
rule, except for a duty to refrain from intentional mischief, with respect
to licensees and trespassers.' 5 By 1945, the "no duty" rule jurisdictions
could be characterized as only "a bare majority".' In that period of
time, a minority position had emerged similar in substance to the
common law tripartite classification. The minority position was codified
[hereinafter cited as HARPER & JAMES]. For leading cases, see 38 AM. JUR., Negligence § 92 (1941);
65 C.J.S. Negligence § 23 (1950).
7. BOHLEN 163; 2 HARPER &JAMES § 27.1.
8. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 76 (1955) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]; 2 RESTAT-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 333 (1965). However, the rights of the landowner have been limited
in this area by other distinct inroads such as the "attractive nuisance" doctrine.
9. BOHLEN 164-68.
10. P OSSER § 77.
II. BOHLEN 183.
12. Id. 183-84.
13. Early authorities used the terms "invitee" and "business guest" interchangeably. This was
because business guests alone occupied the more protected status of invitee. BOHLEN chs. 2,3. See
also 2 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 332 (1934) and accompanying Comment.
14. BOHLEN 183-84.
15. 35 Mo. L. REv. 252, 256 n.34 and accompanying text (1970).
16. Id.; cf Porchey v. Kelling, 353 Mo. 1034, 1042, 185 S.W.2d 820, 823 (1945).
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in the Restatement of Torts published in 1934.11 Between then and 1968,
most states either explicitly or implicitly approved of the Restatement
formula. 8 In addition, during this time, many jurisdictions have
increased the protection owed to certain trespassers."5
Recent years have marked a trend toward piecemeal abolition of the
licensee status, the objective standard of due care being conferred upon
all who enter the land with permission.2" This trend is reflected by the
1965 Revision of the Restatement. 2' Instead of requiring "actual
knowledge" of a dangerous condition on his premises, which was the
earlier Restatement standard with respect to duty owed to licensees, the
1965 Revision would hold a possessor liable to a licensee injured by a
dangerous condition on his premises if he knew or had reason to know of
that condition. 22 The central difference between the duty owed to invitees
and that owed to licensees under the Restatement Second is in the duty to
inspect. No such duty is owed to licensees .2
17. See generally 2 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 329-350 (1934).
18. See 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS Appendix §§ 328-350 and citations therein.
19. For instance, discovered trespassers are often said to be owed a duty of ordinary care, Like-
wise are frequent trespassers on a limited area. Possessors who carry on dangerous activities are
sometimes said to owe trespassers a higher degree of care. And courts have developed the doctrine of
attractive nuisance to protect trespassing children from dangers which due to their judgment might
not be appreciated. See generally PROSSER § 76.
20. Where the injured plaintiff has accompanied an invitee onto the land, he is accorded invitec
status. Kennedy v. Phillips, 319 Mo. 533, 5 S.W.2d 33 (1928). Policeman and fireman have
occasionally been declared invitees. Cameron v. Abatiel, 241 A.2d 310 (Vt. 1968) (policemen); Dini
v. Naiditch, 20 I11. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881, 885 (1960) (firemen). A New Jersey court has found that
a plaintiff fireman who was inspecting fire escapes for safety was a business invitee while retaining
the rule that firemen fighting fires are mere licensees. Walsh v. Madison Park Properties Ltd., 102
N.J. Super. 134, 245 A.2d 512 (1968). In Louisiana, all social guests have been accorded invitee
status. Alexander v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp., 98 So. 2d 730 (La. App.
1957). See also Carr v. Brooks, 356 S.W.2d 293, 298 (Mo. App. 1962); McLaughlin v. Marlatt, 296
Mo. 656, 246 S.W. 548 (1922)(rifle); Ahnefeld v. Wabash Ry. Co., 212 Mo. 280, 11 S.W. 95
(1908)(train).
21. A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to licensees by a condition
on the land if, but only if,
(a) the possessor knows or has reason to know of the condition and should realize that it
involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such licensees, and should expect that they will not
discover or realize the danger, and
(b) he fails to exercise reasonable care to make the condition safe, or to warn the licensees of
the condition and the risk involved, and
(c) the licensees do not know or have reason to know of the condition and the risk involved.
2 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 342 (1965 Revision).
22. Id. § 342(a).
23. The second RESTATEMENT language ["knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would
discover the condition" § 343 (a)] like that of the first ["knows or by the exercise of reasonable care
could discover" § 343(a) (emphasis added)] has been interpreted by most courts to call for an
inspection of the premises. See 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 and accompanying
Comment b.
24. The licensee must receive a warning or be accorded repair only if "the possessor knows or has
Washington University Open Scholarship
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In Missouri, the licensee was originally afforded no more protection
than the trespasser.?' To both, the possessor owed only a duty to refrain
from setting intentional traps. To mitigate the rigors of the application
of this strict test, the Missouri courts developed several well-known
exceptions to this rule. Speaking for the majority in Wells v. Goforth,
Judge Donnelly presents a chronology of this development, noting first,
that in 1909 the Missouri Supreme Court said in Glaser v. Rothschild:
The general rule is that the owner or occupier of premises is under no duty
to protect those from injury who go upon the premises as volunteers...
in no way connected with business or other relations with the owner or
occupier . . . .A bare licensee (barring wantonness, or some form of
intentional wrong, or active negligence by the owner or occupier) takes the
premises as he finds them. (Emphasis added)26
Gilliland v. Bondurant set down another exception to the no duty rule,
in addition to the three appearing in parenthesis above: "The only duty
of the owner is that he must not wilfully or wantonly injure [the licensee]
or knowingly let him go into a hidden peril . . .,,12 However, in
Anderson v. Cinnamon, "This court declined to extend the hidden peril
exception to situations other than those involving harmful chemicals,
explosives and other dangerous material."' ' Other exceptions to the
"no duty" rule not mentioned in Wells have been fashioned in
Missouri.2 With respect to most licensees and trespassers, however,
the no duty rule remained in force. 0
The significance of Wells is that it appears to be an across the board
reason to know of the condition." The subjective, or actual knowledge test of the first Restatement
is no longer required. Knowledge of suspicious circumstance would be enough. There is no language
from which courts could impute a duty to inspect. See RESTATEWMNT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 342 and
accompanying Comment d. (1965).
25. See, e.g., Glaser v. Rothschild, 221 Mo. 180, 120 S.W. I (1909).
26. Id.
27. 332 Mo. 881, 59 S.W.2d 679 (1933).
28. 282 S.W.2d 445 (Mo. 1935).
29. For example, Missouri courts created the following exceptions: "attractive nuisance",
Bichsel v. Blumhost, 429 S.W.2d 301, 303 (Mo. App. 1968); Bayer v. Guidicy Marble, Terrozzo &
Tile Co., 246 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Mo. 1952); the "hard-by" rule which holds the possessor to a duty
of due care to protect users of a public right-of-way who inadvertently stray onto his adjacent
property, Patterson v. Gibson, 287 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Mo. 1956); "Discovered trespassers" are
owed a duty of ordinary care, McVicor v. W.R. Arthur & Co., 312 S.W.2d 805, 812 (Mo. 1958);
railroads have a duty to look out for trespassers, Everett v. St. Louis & S.F.R.R., 214 Mo. 54, 112
S.W. 486 (1908); Ahnefeld v. Wabash R.R., 212 Mo. 280, 111 S.W. 95 (1908). See also 35 Mo. L.
REV. 252, 255 (1970).
30. See 35 Mo. L. REV. 252, 255 (1970).
Vol. 1971:1241
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1971/iss1/7
128 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
abrogation of the feudalistic no duty rule with respect to licensees. 3' One
factor motivating the court to take this final step is undoubtedly the
large volume of adjudication called for by the piecemeal approach. The
greater consideration, however, is that Missouri law relating to this
subject "is outmoded".3 2
Having limited itself to a choice of either the first Restatement or
the second, the Wells court chose the first:3
We do not believe a possessor of land should be subject to liability for
bodily harm caused to gratitutous licensees by a natural or artificial
condition thereon unless the possessor is himself aware of the condition. 3'
Missouri's adoption of the first Restatement § 342 is subject to
several criticisms. First, it creates an unjustifiable distinction between
the standard of care required for licensees and that required for invitees.
The possessor is liable for injury caused to a licensee only if he has actual
knowledge of that condition, and fails to warn or repair.3 Courts have
never interpreted this language to call for a duty to inspect.36 For
invitees, however, the first Restatement subjects the possessor to liability
if he "knows, or by the exercise of reasonable care could discover, the
condition . . . . ,,37 Courts almost universally construe this language to
call for an inspection of the premises, and to hold him liable for injury
(to an invitee) caused by any defects which a reasonable man would have
discovered upon inspection. While a possessor's actual knowledge of
31. Id. 252.
32. 443 S.W.2d at 158.
33. As stated in the text above the court refused to find defendant liable under either the "active
negligence" or the "hidden peril" exception. Rather, it remanded with the instruction that he be
judged under the first RESTATEMENT standard.
34. 443 S.W.2d at 158.
35. See note 2 supra.
36. See note 23 supra.
37. A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to business visitors
by a natural or artificial condition thereon if, but only if, he
(a) knows, or by the exercise of reasonable care could discover, the condition which, if
known to him, he should realize as involving an unreasonable risk to them, and
(b) has no reason to believe that they will discover the condition or realize the risk involved
therein, and
(c) invites or permits them to enter or remain upon the land without exercising reasonable
care
(i) to make the condition reasonable safe, or
(ii) to give a warning adequate to enable them to avoid the harm without relinquish-
ing any of the services which they are entitled to receive, if the possessor is a public
utility.
2 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 343. Missouri has used the first RESTATEMENT formula for invitees
since 1942. See also Hudson v. Kansas City Baseball Club, 349 Mo. 1215, 164 S.W.2d 318 (1942).
38. See note 23 supra. See also 2 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 343. Comment a (1934).
[Vol. 1971:124
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the condition (subjective standard) must be shown by the licensee before
he can recover, the invitee need only show that a reasonable man would
have appreciated the danger (objective standard).
Advocates of the subjective standard have reasoned that
compensation for injuries should only be awarded if there is "some
attendant moral turpitude, at the least an indifferent or inadvertant state
of mind."'3' The rationale of the objective or external standard4' is that
the innocently injured should be compensated by those at fault
regardless of moral turpitude. Since our social policy is to prevent or
compensate for all harmful conduct, the subjective standard has been
rejected in most of neglegence law."
If for instance a man is born hasty and awkward, is always hurting
himself or his neighbors, no doubt his congenital defects will be allowed
for in the courts of heaven, but his slips are no less troublesome to his
neighbors than if they sprang from guilty neglect. His neighbors
accordingly require him at his peril to come up to their standard, and the
courts which they establish decline to take his personal equation into
account.4"
The Wells opinion suggests no reasons why the landholder, alone among
men, should be judged by the subjective standard.13
This inconsistency is complicated by the insertion of the actual
knowledge requirement in the test for licensees but not for invitees. In
Associated Dry Golds Corp. v. Drake,44 an invitee slipped on worn and
39. P. FITZGERALD, SALMOND ON JURISPRUDENCE 389-392 (1966); R. HEUSTON, SALMOND ON
TORTS 268 (1965).
40. The objective standard is termed external because the conduct in question is compared to that
of the "reasonable man".
41. HARPER & JAMES 900. Two additional reasons for rejecting the subjective standards are
proposed: (1) state of mind is hard to prove, (2) wherever the results differ, those from the mental
or subjective test are less desirable.
42. 0. HOLMES. THE COMMON LAW 108 (1881); Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Aitken, 196
U.S. 589 (1905); Vaughn v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (1837); Heaven v. Pender, II Q.B.D. 503,
509 (1883); see generally Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective?, 41 HARV. L. REv. I (1927).
43. In Orr v. Bradley, 126 Mo. App. 146, 103 S.W. 1149 (1907), a house had been burned so that
only the walls were left standing. The court stated that the landowner's actual judgment or thought
as to whether or not it was a dangerous condition was not the standard. The actual state of mind had
no place in the question. The issue was what would a reasonable man have realized. The explanation
for the choice of standards is that the wall fell on a neighboring house, not on a licensee. In Smith v.
Southwest Mo. Ry., 333 Mo. 314, 320, 62 S.W.2d 761, 763 (1933), the Missouri Supreme Court
adopted a rule that would have completely equalized the status of invitees and licensees. The court
stated "that the defendant railroad company knew or in the exercise of reasonable care would have
known of these conditions and realized that they involved an unreasonable risk to the plaintiff
[licenseel. The court has since distinguished and then ignored the Smith case.
44. 394 F.2d 637 (8th Cir. 1968). See also Trabue v. Fields, 433 S.W. 2d 48 (Mo. App. 1968);
Zacher v. Missouri Real Estate & Ins. Co., 393 S.W. 2d 446 (Mo. App. 1965).
Vol. 1971:124]
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rounded steps that become slippery when it rained. The plaintiff could
not show that defendant actually knew that the steps were worn smooth
so that inclement weather would make them dangerous, but the court
held it "common knowledge that steps became worn and rounded and
beveled over a period of years." 45 If the plaintiff in Associated Dry
Goods had been a licensee suing under Wells, he could not have
recovered, for the landowner did not actually know of the condition. The
result turns on the state of mind of the defendant; in effect, he knows of
the condition for the invitee but not for the licensee. The layman
licensee's faith in the law might well be blunted, if it were explained to
him that if the landowner had expected a monetary benefit, he would
have known of the dangerous condition and been liable for the damages
resulting from it.4"
Secondly, the Wells case may have the effect of fostering an
undesirable social policy. By holding that an occupier must actually
know of the dangerous condition, the Missouri court has put a premium
on ignorance and forgetfullness.47 Applying a similar subjective (actual
knowledge) requirement, a federal court of another jurisdiction found
that the Army was not liable when they abandoned a training ground
with live mines on it and an injury subsequently resulted. Since the Army
had discharged its duty by removing all the mines whose location they
actually remembered, they did not have to warn a licensee on the land
and they were not liable for his injuries.4"
Third, Wells fails to provide a framework in which it will be
unnecessary to manipulate the exceptions to the "no-duty" rule. Yet,
plaintiffs will undoubtedly continue to argue these exceptions since at
least one of them holds a possessor to a higher degree of care than that
set down in Wells.49 In not explicitly overruling them, Wells assures that
45. 394 F.2d at 642.
46. The requirement that the licensee should be judged by an objective standard as to issue of his
knowledge of the dangerous condition would seem to be additionally inconsistent particularly in
light of the often made statement that the liability of the landowner is predicated on his superior
knowledge.
47. The mental theory in either of its chief forms-that negligence is or that it necessarily
involves, inadvertence or indifference-would leave the general security unprotected against
that vast amount of dangerous and harmful conduct which results not from inadvertence or
indifference but from deficiencies in knowledge, memory, observation, imagination,
foresight, intelligence, judgment, quickness of reaction, deliberation, coolness, self-control,
determination, courage and the like.
Edgerton, Negligence, Inadvertence and Indifference: The Relation of Mental States to Negligence,
39 HARV. L. REv. 849, 867 (1926).
48. Ford v. United States, 200 F.2d 272 (10th Cir. 1952).
49. The objective standard of care is required of a possessor engaged in an activity after the
[Vol. 1971:124
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they will still be utilized. In cases like Cupp v. Montgomery,e which
prompted the reform of the licensee rule, if the defendant was on remand
shown to have not actually known of the mud on the porch, the court
may still have to go through the identical contortions to submit the issue
of negligence to the jury.
Fourth, it is doubtful that Wells has brought about any changes in
Missouri law at all. Prior to Wells, the landowner had no duty to the
licensee except for the exceptions set forth above. For instance, he could
not knowingly let the licensee go into a hidden peril.5 Stated conversely,
the landowner had a duty to warn of or repair hidden perils. The Wells
rule is that a landowner must warn or repair all conditions "which
involve an unreasonable risk" to licensees, and of which he actually
knows and which the reasonably prudent licensee would not discover.
Such conditions are the equivalent of a "hidden peril". Now the
landowner must warn the licensee of known perils which are
undiscoverable to the licensee; whereas before, he did not have to warn of
anything but known perils which were hidden. 52
In reaching their new formulation the Missouri court probably
accorded respect to precedent, interests relying on that precedent, and a
respect for the priviledged position of the landowner, yet other
jurisdictions have found sufficient reason to reject this landholder's
immunity. In Keramec v. Compagnie General Transatlantiquej the
United States Supreme Court reasoned that the simple, feudal concept
landholder's immunity was no longer applicable to our industrialized,
urban society with its complex relationships and that the result of its use
had been the creation of refinements and illogical exceptions. California
found the system unreflective of the many factors which should
determine liability.
Some of the factors, including the closeness of the connection between the
injury and the defendant's conduct, the moral blame attached to the
defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, and the
prevalence and availability of insurance, bear little, if any, relationship to
licensee's presence has been discovered or using an inherently dangerous substance. Gilliland v.
Bondurant, 332 Mo. 881, 59 S.W. 2d 679 (1933).
50. 408 S.W. 2d 353 (Mo. 1966).
51. Id.
52. Arguably this assessment is much too harsh, for the imposition of the duty upon the
landowner would seem to put the burden on him to prove that he did not know of the condition or
that the licensee should reasonably have been aware of it. But see 35 Mo. L. REv. 252 (1970), where
it is pointed out that the plaintiff must prove as part of his case that he could not have been
reasonably expected to discover the dangerous condition.
53. 358 U.S. 625 (1959).
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the classification of trespasser, licensee, and invitee and the existing rules
of conferring immunity.u
Fifty years ago, Bohlen made note of a steady movement toward
squaring the landowner's duties to visitors on his land with other prin-
ciples in negligence law.'s In Keramec, the Supreme Court found that
the trend creating a single duty of reasonable care in all circumstances
had made impractical the introduction of the invitee-licensee-trespasser
"semantic morass" from property law into maritime law. Later, the
Supreme Court rejected these classifications again and decided that they
were too illusory to have any application in fourth amendment "illegal
search and seizure" decisions.s Recently, the California Supreme Court
found that the protection of life and limb was also too important an issue
to be determined by these ethereal categorizations. 57
Missouri adopted an actual knowledge requirement as a prerequisite
to a landholder's liability to a licensee for injuries caused by a dangerous
condition. This requirement maintains much of the very framework the
earlier Missouri courts have consistently found unworkable. The social
basis of the law of trespassers, licensees and invitees has changed. The
lessened recognition of the privileged position of the landowner, the
increasing respect for life and limb, and the complexity of the
relationships of an urban-industrial society dictate a reconsideration of
the doctrine. The law in Missouri has not adapted to reflect present
social conditions. Wells v. Goforth is an unacceptably small step in that
direction.
54. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 115, 443 P.2d 561,568, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 103 (1969).
55. BOHLEN.
56. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1959).
57. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 115,443 P.2d 561, 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 103 (1969):
A man's life and limb does not become less worthy of protection by law nor less worthy of
compensation under the law because he has come upon the land of another without
permission or with permission but without a business purpose.
[Vol. 1971:124
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